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Abstract
This paper studies resource-allocation mechanisms by using a reduced-form no-
tion of mechanism. We formulate a mechanism by specifying the state space of
the mechanism, the set of outcomes that agents can induce in a given state, and
the set of admissible outcomes in each state. This notion of mechanism includes
the Walrasian mechanism and majority voting as well as all game forms. With
this notion, monotonicity is not only necessary but suﬃcient for a social choice
correspondence to be implementable. Our main result is that in the context of ex-
change economies, if a mechanism implements a sub-correspondence of the Pareto
correspondence and satisﬁes localness (one’s “budget set” in a given state is inde-
pendent of other agents’ endowments), then the mechanism necessarily implements
a sub-correspondence of the core correspondence. If the mechanism also satisﬁes
anonymity, then it actually implements a sub-correspondence of the Walrasian
equilibrium correspondence.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates economic mechanisms or institutions by using a generalized
notion of mechanism. The notion of mechanism proposed in this paper includes all game
forms but it also includes the Walrasian mechanism and majority voting. It is a reduce-
form notion in that it does not necessarily give a complete speciﬁcation of how the
mechanism works. On the other hand, this approach enables us to formulate dynamic
institutions in a simple and static way and provides a convenient tool for axiomatic
analysis of institutions. We characterize implementable social choice correspondences
using our notion of mechanism and prove axiomatic characterizations of the core and
Walrasian correspondences.
In the literature of mechanism design and implementation, mechanisms are usually
described as game forms. The advantage of the notion of game form is that a game form
can give a complete speciﬁcation of an institution and leaves no ambiguity about how it
works. This gives us a compelling reason to use game forms for describing mechanisms.
However, game forms are not very convenient for axiomatic analysis of institutions,
particularly when the goal is to gain insight into real-life institutions. Institutions in
real world are usually dynamic and their detailed speciﬁcation requires extensive game
forms. For example, markets involve a dynamic process of price formation, and the
work on the foundation of markets usually proposes a dynamic model of markets (e.g.,
Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990; Gale, 2000). Unfortunately, dynamic models are not
very tractable for axiomatic analysis, whose objective is to characterize institutions
that satisfy a list of axioms. Extensive game forms may be suitable when one has
already chosen a small class of institutions to examine, but not to identify important
institutions. This makes it sensible to consider a static notion of mechanism that can
describe dynamic institutions in a reasonable way. Static models omit some details of
institutions and would not be completely satisfactory, but they oﬀer convenient tools
for axiomatic analysis.
This paper proposes a general reduced-form notion of mechanism, which is a rather
straightforward generalization of the Walrasian mechanism. We deﬁne a mechanism by
specifying the set of states of the mechanism, the “budget set” of each agent in a given
state, and the set of admissible outcomes in a given state. Speciﬁcally, a mechanism is
deﬁned as a triple (Z,E,H). The ﬁrst entry Z is an arbitrary non-empty set of possible
states of the mechanism. The second entry E speciﬁes the set of outcomes that each
agent can induce in a given state. The set E(i, z) is called the eﬀectivity set of agent i
in state z. The ﬁnal component of a mechanism is H, which speciﬁes the set of feasible
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outcomes that are admissible in a given state, i.e., the outcome has to belong to H(z)
when the state is z. The triple (Z,E,H) is called an eﬀectivity form.
Eﬀectivity forms evidently generalize the Walrasian mechanism. In the Walrasian
mechanism, the state is a price vector, the eﬀectivity set is the usual budget set, and
all feasible allocations are admissible.
Eﬀectivity forms also generalize game forms. A game form is an eﬀectivity form in
which the state is a strategy proﬁle, one’s eﬀectivity set at a strategy proﬁle consists of
what he can induce given the other agents’ strategies, and the only admissible outcome
for a strategy proﬁle is what is assigned by the outcome function.
We can generalize the notion of mechanism even further by specifying the eﬀectivity
set for each coalition. This generalization would be important when groups of agents
often act jointly. With this generalization, we can, for example, formulate majority rule,
for which a coalition in the majority can induce any alternative. Generally, we can use
eﬀectivity forms to formulate institutions that underlie the core in various settings.
A noncooperative equilibrium of an eﬀectivity form is a pair (x, z) of an allocation x
and a state z such that in state z, allocation x is admissible and no one has a preferred
bundle in his eﬀectivity set. We can also deﬁne cooperative equilibrium analogously.
The noncooperative equilibrium of the market mechanism is identical to the Walrasian
equilibrium. The cooperative equilibria of majority voting are equivalent to the Con-
dorcet winners. For game forms, the noncooperative (resp. cooperative) equilibrium
reduces to the Nash (resp. strong) equilibrium.
An obvious drawback of the notion of eﬀectivity form is that it does not necessarily
specify how the state is determined, which makes it unclear how the mechanism actually
works. Our implicit assumption is that the state is determined by the action of agents
in a dynamic process, but we do not make the process explicit for the sake of simplic-
ity. This simpliﬁcation makes our notion somewhat unsatisfactory and is problematic
particularly when it comes to a practical implementation of a mechanism. However,
there exists a trade-oﬀ between completeness and simplicity. While an eﬀectivity form
is not a complete model of an institution, it provides a simple and convenient way of
describing an institution that may involve a complex dynamic process.
To gain intuition of the above argument, consider the dynamics of a conversation.
The state of a conversation would be the topic. Anyone in the conversation can change
the topic, but certain changes are considered inappropriate (e.g., from serious topics
to vulgar ones). The function E can be considered as a moral rule specifying socially
correct changes of topics. The equilibrium then describes the steady state of the con-
versation, which would depend crucially on admissible changes of topics. An academic
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topic would not be a steady state when the change from an academic topic to gossip is
admissible and everyone prefers gossip. We do not deny a possibility of modeling con-
versations by means of extensive game forms, but more static reduced-form modeling
would be practical.
It turns out that, for our reduced-form notion of mechanism, the standard mono-
tonicity condition of Maskin (1999) is not only necessary but suﬃcient for the im-
plementability of a social choice correspondence. This holds for general social choice
problems, even for non-economic environments and for two-person case.1 Furthermore,
the result holds whether the equilibrium concept is noncooperative or cooperative.
A drawback of this characterization is that it relies on the assumption that any
mechanism can be used. In practice, however, not all mechanisms can be used. Some
mechanisms are practical and others are not. Thus, it would be more interesting to
characterize social choice correspondences that can be implemented by “practical” or
“reasonable” mechanisms. Fortunately, the notion of eﬀectivity form suggests a number
of interesting axioms that are not very meaningful in the traditional framework. We
propose a few axioms of reasonable mechanisms, and characterize implementability
when mechanisms are required to satisfy the axioms. For this, we focus on exchange
economies.
We consider the following axioms. The ﬁrst axiom is anonymity, which states that
the eﬀectivity set does not depend on the names of the agents. That is, two agents
with the same endowments are given the same eﬀectivity set. The second axiom,
called localness, states that one’s eﬀectivity set in a given state does not depend on
the other agents’ endowments. The market mechanism satisﬁes localness because a
consumer at a grocery store does not need to know other consumers’ endowments. Our
last axiom, called non-exclusivity, states that the mechanism does not prohibit any
feasible allocation in any state. In other words, equilibrium only requires feasibility
and individual (or coalitional) optimality, and nothing more.
We ﬁrst prove that the last two axioms characterize the mechanism that underlies
the notion of core. Speciﬁcally, we show that for any mechanism that satisﬁes local-
ness and non-exclusivity (but not necessarily anonymity), if its equilibrium allocations
are Pareto eﬃcient and individually rational for all proﬁles of preferences, then the
equilibrium allocations are necessarily in the core. This holds whether the equilibrium
concept is noncooperative or cooperative.
1For game-form implementation, monotonicity is necessary but not suﬃcient (Maskin, 1999; Saijo,
1988). Moreover, the two-person case needs to be dealt with separately (Moore and Repullo, 1990;
Dutta and Sen, 1991b).
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It turns out that if we add anonymity to our list of axioms, then the axioms char-
acterize the Walrasian mechanism, provided that the equilibrium concept is noncoop-
erative. That is, we show that for any mechanism that satisﬁes anonymity, localness,
and non-exclusivity, if its noncooperative equilibrium allocations are Pareto eﬃcient
for all proﬁles of preferences, then the equilibrium allocations are necessarily Walrasian
equilibrium allocations.
We also conduct a similar axiomatic analysis in the context of public good economies.
It turns out that an analogous characterization does not hold for public-good economies.
We ﬁrst show that anonymity alone is incompatible with Pareto eﬃciency. That is,
there exists no anonymous mechanism that implements a sub-correspondence of the
Pareto correspondence. The Lindahl mechanism uses personalized prices, and it is
intuitively clear that a personalized system is necessary to achieve eﬃciency in public-
good economies. Our result conﬁrms the intuition.
We also show that the other axioms (i.e., localness and non-exclusivity) do not
characterize the Lindahl mechanism. That is, there exists a local and non-exclusive
mechanism whose equilibrium allocations are always Pareto eﬃcient but are not nec-
essarily Lindahl allocations.
These results for public-good economies are interesting given the considerable dif-
ference between Walrasian and Lindahl equilibria in terms of practical importance.
The literature has explored the diﬀerence between the two equilibrium concepts, e.g.,
in terms of incentives for preference revelation (Roberts, 1976) and core convergence
(Muench, 1972). On the other hand, for many of the axiomatic characterizations of
Walrasian equilibrium in the literature, there are parallel characterizations of Lindahl
equilibrium.
Walrasian equilibrium has been characterized by a number of studies. We mention
only a few studies that are particularly relevant to our study.
One of the most inﬂuential characterizations of Walrasian equilibrium is the limit
theorem of Debreu and Scarf (1963). Interestingly, we use the limit theorem in our
proof. It should be noted, however, that while we use the limit theorem, our result
is not about the limit of a sequence of economies. Our result says that the equilib-
rium allocations of the eﬀectivity form that satisfy our axioms are Walrasian for all
economies.
A similar implementation-theoretic characterization of Walrasian equilibrium is ob-
tained by Hurwicz (1979a). Hurwicz shows that if a game form implements a sub-
correspondence of the Pareto correspondence in Nash equilibrium and satisﬁes the
property that the attainable set (i.e., the eﬀectivity set associated with the game form)
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is a convex set, then the implemented correspondence is a sub-correspondence of the
Walrasian correspondence.2
A number of studies characterize Walrasian equilibrium based on the concept of no-
envy in net trades (e.g., Schmeidler and Vind, 1972; Varian, 1976; Mas-Colell, 1987).
No-envy in net trades is based on the idea that, in the underlying mechanism, each
agent is eﬀective for the same set of net trades. This concept is considerably stronger
than our concept of anonymity. Our anonymity axiom states that two agents with
identical endowments are eﬀective for the same set of net trades, but it allows for a
mechanism in which agents with diﬀerent endowments are treated diﬀerently.3
2 The Model
Let N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of potential agents. Let N be a collection of non-empty
ﬁnite subsets N ⊆ N such that |N | ≥ 2. The set of agents in an economy is a set in
N . This formulation allows for variable population as well as ﬁxed population. If the
set of agents is ﬁxed, then N is a singleton.
Let C be the consumption space of an agent, which is an arbitrary non-empty set
and assumed to be the same for all agents. Elements of C are called consumption
bundles.
Each agent in an economy has a complete and transitive binary (preference) relation
Ri deﬁned over C. As usual, xi Ri yi means that xi is at least as good as yi for agent i.
The associated strict preference and indiﬀerence relations are denoted by Pi and Ii,
respectively. The set of admissible preferences is denoted by R. A preference proﬁle
for N is denoted by R = (Ri)i∈N ∈ RN . We assume that preferences are not known to
the planner.
Agent i’s characteristics other than his preferences are given by an element ωi of
a non-empty set Ω. The set Ω is common to all agents. For example, in the context
of exchange economies, ωi is i’s endowments and Ω ⊆ R+. In what follows, ωi ∈ Ω is
called the characteristics of agent i. We assume that ωi is observable to the planner.
Suppose that the set of agents is N ∈ N and their characteristics are ω ∈ ΩN . Then
the set of (feasible) allocations for (N,ω) is given by a non-empty set X(N,ω). The
relation between an allocation and each agent’s consumption is given by a function π.
2An interesting diﬀerence between Hurwicz’s characterization and ours is that, in the context of
public good economies, Hurwicz’s condition of convex attainable sets does characterize Lindahl equi-
librium.
3Other characterizations of Walrasian equilibrium include Sonnenschein (1974), Hurwicz (1977),
Ostroy (1980), Thomson (1988), Nagahisa (1991), Dagan (1996), and Serrano and Volij (2000).
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For all N ∈ N , all ω ∈ ΩN , all x ∈ X(N,w), and all i ∈ N , π(i, x) ∈ C speciﬁes
agent i’s consumption in allocation x.
To summarize, an environment is deﬁned by a list (N , C,X(·, ·), π,R,Ω). An
economy for a given environment is a list (N,R, ω) where N ∈ N is the set of agents,
R ∈ RN is the proﬁle of preferences, and ω ∈ ΩN is the proﬁle of characteristics. Let
E denote the set of all economies for a given environment.
We give a few examples of environments, which are used in subsequent sections of
the paper.
Example 1 (Exchange Economies). The common consumption space is C =
R

+. The set R is the set of all complete, transitive, continuous, strongly monotonic,4
and strictly convex binary relations deﬁned over R+. An agent’s characteristics ωi are
his endowments of goods, and Ω = R++.








The function π is given by π(i, x) = xi.
Example 2 (Public Good Economies). Consider economies with one public
good and one private good where technology is linear. The common consumption
space is C = R2+. The set R is the set of all complete, transitive, continuous, strongly
monotonic, and strictly convex binary relations deﬁned over R2+. An agent’s charac-
teristics ωi are his endowments of the private good, and Ω = R++. An allocation for








where y denotes the level of the public good, and xi denotes agent i’s consumption of
the private good. The function π is given by π(i, (y, x)) = (y, xi).
Example 3 (Voting). Consider a standard voting setting where the set of alter-
natives is given by some set A. Then the common consumption space is C = A. The
agents are identical except for their preferences, and thus |Ω| = 1. An allocation is
simply an alternative x ∈ A, i.e., X(N,ω) = A. The function π is given by π(i, x) = x.
4A preference relation Ri deﬁned over R

+ is strongly monotonic if for all xi, yi ∈ R+, if xi  yi (i.e.,
xik ≥ yik for all k ∈ {1, . . . , }) and xi = yi, then xi Pi yi.
5
R++ = {x ∈ R : x > 0}. When x ∈ R++, we may write x  0.
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These examples demonstrate the generality of our framework.
3 Generalized Mechanisms
We ﬁx an environment (N , C,X(·, ·), π,R,Ω). We consider the following notion of
mechanism.
Deﬁnition. An eﬀectivity form is a list Γ = (ZN,ω, EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN where
1. ZN,ω is a non-empty set of possible states of the mechanism.
2. EN,ω is a correspondence that associates with each non-empty coalition S ⊆ N
and each state z ∈ ZN,ω a subset EN,ω(S, z) ⊆ CS . The set EN,ω(S, z) is called
the eﬀectivity set of coalition S in state z.
3. HN,ω is a correspondence that associates with each state z ∈ Z a non-empty sub-
set HN,ω(z) ⊆ X(N,ω) of feasible allocations. This may be called the outcome
correspondence.
The three components of the eﬀectivity form are all indexed by (N,ω). This comes
from our assumption that the planner knows the set of agents and their characteristics
(other than preferences). Note that the index is unnecessary when the set of agents is
ﬁxed (i.e., |N | = 1) and agents diﬀer only in their preferences (i.e., |Ω| = 1). However,
it is important for our analysis to allow (N,ω) to be variable.
The ﬁrst component, ZN,ω, speciﬁes the set of possible states of the mechanism. In
the market mechanism, the state is a price vector. In general, the state space can be
any non-empty set.
The second component, EN,ω, speciﬁes what each decision-making group is entitled
to obtain in each state. The set EN,ω(S, z) is a subset of CS and it denotes the set of
consumption-bundle proﬁles that coalition S can obtain in state z. This set determines
whether S can “block” or “improve upon” a given allocation in state z. Note that
EN,ω(S, z) speciﬁes what each member of S can obtain, not the aggregate consumption
that S can obtain as a whole. When the relevant equilibrium concept is noncooperative,
the set EN,ω(S, z) is irrelevant for all non-singleton coalitions.
The last component, HN,ω, speciﬁes the set of feasible allocations that are admissi-
ble for a given state. That is, the planner prohibits or “blocks” all allocations outside
of HN,ω(z) when the state is z.
We do not necessarily require that the proﬁles of consumption bundles in EN,ω(S, z)
should be feasible. This formulation is consistent with general equilibrium theory. On
8
the other hand, the eﬀectivity set does not have to violate feasibility. If EN,ω(S, z)
contains only feasible bundles, we say that the eﬀectivity form is closed. Formally,
an eﬀectivity form Γ = (ZN,ω, EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN is closed if for all N ∈ N , all
ω ∈ ΩN , all S ⊆ N , all z ∈ ZN,ω, and all yS ∈ EN,ω(S, z), there exists yN\S ∈ CN\S
such that (yS , yN\S) ∈ X(N,ω).
We allow EN,ω(S, z) to be empty. The set EN,ω(S, z) being empty means that S
cannot block any allocation in z. For example, this is the case for any minority under
majority rule.
As mentioned in the introduction, an important aspect of the notion of eﬀectivity
form is that it does not explicitly specify the process in which the state is determined.
Our idea is that the state is determined by the agents’ action in a dynamic process, but
we do not make the process explicit for the sake of simplicity. This simpliﬁcation makes
it ambiguous how and whether a mechanism actually works, but there exists a trade-oﬀ
between completeness and simplicity. While an eﬀectivity form is not a complete model
of an institution, it provides a simple and convenient way of describing an institution
that may involve a complex dynamic process. By leaving some details unspeciﬁed,
eﬀectivity forms provide clean and static models of dynamic institutions. A practical
advantage of static models is that they are convenient for axiomatic analysis.
On the other hand, to better understand an eﬀectivity form, it is certainly desirable
to study a “foundation” of the mechanism. Once an interesting mechanism is identiﬁed
in reduced form, one could proceed to build a more detailed model of the mechanism
with an explicit dynamic process. This two-step approach might be more practical than
conducting axiomatic analysis directly on extensive game forms.
The notion of eﬀectivity form is a variant of Wilson’s (1971) notion of eﬀectiveness
relations and Rosenthal’s (1972) notion of eﬀectiveness forms. A number of similar
notions have been studied in the literature; e.g., Debreu’s (1952) generalized games,
Ichiishi’s (1981) societies, Moulin and Peleg’s (1982) eﬀectivity functions, and Green-
berg’s (1990) social situations.6 However, these notions have not been used in the
mechanism-design literature, where virtually all studies use game forms. The impor-
tant exceptions that we are aware of are Greenberg (1990, 1994) and Ju (2001), whose
work will be discussed in the next section.
Once eﬀectivity forms are deﬁned, it is straightforward to deﬁne equilibrium con-
cepts for them. For a given eﬀectivity form and a given preference proﬁle, a noncoop-
erative equilibrium is a pair (x, z) such that, in state z, allocation x is admissible and
6In particular, Greenberg’s social situations are more general than eﬀectivity forms in that they
allow agents to change the state.
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is not blocked by any agent. That is, given that the state is z, no one, including the
planner, blocks x. Similarly, a cooperative equilibrium is a pair (x, z) such that, in state
z, neither the planner nor a coalition blocks x. Formally,
Deﬁnition. Let Γ = (ZN,ω, EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN be an eﬀectivity form, and let
e = (N,R, ω) ∈ E be an economy. Then a noncooperative equilibrium of Γ for e is
a pair (x, z) ∈ X(N,ω)×ZN,ω of an allocation and a state such that x ∈ HN,ω(z) and
there exists no i ∈ N and no yi ∈ EN,ω(i, z) for which
yi Pi π(i, x).
On the other hand, a cooperative equilibrium of Γ for e is a pair (x, z) ∈ X(N,ω)×
ZN,ω such that x ∈ HN,ω(z) and there exist no S ⊆ N and no (yi)i∈S ∈ EN,ω(S, z) for
which
yi Pi π(i, x) for all i ∈ S.
An allocation x ∈ X(N,ω) is a noncooperative (resp. cooperative) equilib-
rium allocation of an eﬀectivity form Γ for an economy e = (N,R, ω) if there exists
a state z ∈ ZN,ω such that (x, z) is a noncooperative (resp. cooperative) equilibrium
of Γ for e. Let N (Γ, e) and C (Γ, e) denote the sets of noncooperative and cooperative
equilibrium allocations of Γ for e, respectively.7
Note that our deﬁnitions of equilibria do not require one’s consumption bundle to
be in his eﬀectivity set. All we require is that one should not have a preferred bundle
in his eﬀectivity set. A situation in which an agent consumes outside of his eﬀectivity
set is not necessarily unstable because his consumption might be desirable for him
compared to his eﬀectivity set. What causes instability is that an agent can induce a
preferred outcome.8
We give a few examples to illustrate the above deﬁnitions.
Example 4 (Market Mechanism). Consider exchange economies deﬁned in Ex-
7The set C (Γ, e) may be called the core of Γ for e.
8 This formulation is standard in economics. For example, the core does not require that the
aggregate consumption of a coalition be feasible for the coalition. Individual rationality does not
require that each agent’s utility should be equal to the individual-rationality level.
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ample 1. The market mechanism can be formulated as an eﬀectivity form given by
ZN,ω = {p ∈ R+ : p = 0};
EN,ω(i, p) = {yi ∈ R+ : p · yi ≤ p · ωi};
HN,ω(p) = X(N,ω).
That is, the state is a price vector, and the eﬀectivity set of an individual is the usual
budget set. The eﬀectivity sets of non-singleton coalitions are arbitrary. The noncoop-
erative equilibrium of the eﬀectivity form is equivalent to the Walrasian equilibrium.
Example 5 (Game Forms). Any (strategic) game form deﬁnes an eﬀectivity form
in a straightforward way. A game form is a list ((MN,ωi )i∈N , g
N,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN where






is the outcome function. Since (N,ω) is known to the planner, the strategy sets and
the outcome function may depend on (N,ω). The corresponding eﬀectivity form is










That is, the state is a strategy proﬁle and at each strategy proﬁle m, coalition S can






i . The only allocation that
is admissible for strategy proﬁle m is gN,ω(m). The noncooperative (resp. cooperative)
equilibrium of the eﬀectivity form is equivalent to the Nash (resp. strong) equilibrium
of the game form.
Example 6 (Core). Consider exchange economies again. The core of exchange
economies is formulated as the cooperative equilibrium of the following eﬀectivity form:
ZN,ω = arbitrary;
EN,ω(S, z) = X(S, ωS);
HN,ω(z) = X(N,ω).
That is, the state space is arbitrary, and each coalition can redistribute the members’
endowments within the coalition.
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Example 7 (Majority Rule). Consider the voting environment deﬁned in Ex-
ample 3. The majority rule states that a coalition in the majority can choose any
alternative, and a minority is not eﬀective for any alternative. This can be formulated
as the following eﬀectivity form:
ZN = arbitrary;
EN (S, z) =


{(a, . . . , a) : a ∈ A} if |S| > |N |/2;
∅ otherwise;
HN (z) = A,
where A is the set of alternatives. Cooperative equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism
are Condorcet winners.
These examples clearly demonstrate that many of the major institutions studied in
economics can be modeled as eﬀectivity forms.
4 Implementation
We now introduce the notion of implementation with respect to eﬀectivity forms.
A social choice correspondence is a correspondence ϕ that associates with each
economy (N,R, ω) ∈ E a nonempty subset ϕ(N,R, ω) ⊆ X(N,ω) of feasible allocations.
Deﬁnition. Let ϕ be a social choice correspondence. An eﬀectivity form Γ =
(ZN,ω, EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN implements ϕ in noncooperative equilibrium if for
each economy e ∈ E , N (Γ, e) = ϕ(e). The eﬀectivity form Γ implements ϕ in coop-
erative equilibrium if for each economy e ∈ E , C (Γ, e) = ϕ(e).
Remark 1. According to this deﬁnition, the market mechanism (Example 4) imple-
ments the Walrasian correspondence in noncooperative equilibrium by deﬁnition. Since
the publication of Schmeidler (1980) and Hurwicz (1979b), the Nash implementation of
the Walrasian correspondence has been a major topic in implementation theory. Our
deﬁnition makes the noncooperative implementation of the Walrasian correspondence
straightforward because the market mechanism does it.9
9This suggests that our use of the term “implementation” may not be completely acceptable to
some readers. We say that a social choice correspondence is implementable if it is the equilibrium
correspondence of some institution, regardless of whether the institution is described in game form.
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Remark 2. Since a game form is an eﬀectivity form, it follows that our notion of
implementation generalizes the standard notions of implementation. Implementability
by a game form in Nash (resp. strong) equilibrium implies implementability by an
eﬀectivity form in noncooperative (resp. cooperative) equilibrium. The converse does
not hold in general environments, as Theorem 1 shows below.
We now characterize the class of implementable social choice correspondences.
Given an economy e = (N,R, ω), the (weak) lower-contour set of Ri at allocation x
is deﬁned by
L(x,Ri) = {yi ∈ C : π(i, x) Ri yi}.
The lower-contour sets for coalitions are deﬁned similarly. For coalition S, the lower-
contour set is given by
L(x,RS) = {yS ∈ CS : yi ∈ L(x,Ri) for some i ∈ S}.
That is, if yS ∈ L(x,RS), then yS does not (strongly) dominate x for S.
Let LN,ω(x,RS) denote the set of elements in L(x,RS) that are feasible for (N,ω);
that is,
LN,ω(x,RS) = {yS ∈ L(x,RS) : (yS , yN\S) ∈ X(N,ω) for some yN\S ∈ CN\S}.
Deﬁnition. A social choice correspondence ϕ is Gevers monotonic (Gevers,
1986) if for all (N,R, ω) ∈ E , all x ∈ ϕ(N,R, ω), and all R′ ∈ RN , if for all i ∈ N ,
L(x,Ri) ⊆ L(x,R′i), (1)
then x ∈ ϕ(N,R′, ω). We say that ϕ is Maskin monotonic (Maskin, 1999) if it
satisﬁes the above condition where (1) is replaced by
LN,ω(x,Ri) ⊆ LN,ω(x,R′i).
That is, Gevers monotonicity says that if x is ϕ-optimal for (N,R, ω) and another
preference proﬁle R′ is obtained by expanding each agent’s lower-contour set at x, then
x remains ϕ-optimal for (N,R′, ω). Maskin monotonicity is equivalent to Gevers mono-
tonicity except that Maskin monotonicity pays attention only to the feasible bundles
in lower-contour sets.
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Maskin (1999) (resp. Maskin (1979)) proves that Maskin monotonicity is necessary,
but not suﬃcient, for implementability in Nash (resp. strong) equilibrium. Maskin
(1999) and Saijo (1988) prove that if there exist three or more agents, Maskin mono-
tonicity together with a condition called no veto power is suﬃcient for implementability
in Nash equilibrium. Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen (1991a)10 obtain
conditions that are necessary and suﬃcient for implementability in Nash and strong
equilibria, respectively, but their conditions are considerably more complex.
It turns out that our concept of implementation permits a simple characterization.
Theorem 1. A social choice correspondence ϕ is implemented by an eﬀectivity
form in (non)cooperative equilibrium if and only if ϕ is Gevers monotonic. A social
choice correspondence ϕ is implemented by a closed eﬀectivity form in (non)cooperative
equilibrium if and only if ϕ is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The theorem says that Gevers monotonicity is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for implementability whether the equilibrium concept is noncooperative or cooperative.
If eﬀectivity sets are required to satisfy the feasibility condition, then a necessary and
suﬃcient condition is Maskin monotonicity.
Greenberg (1990, Theorem 10.1.2) has obtained a result that is essentially equiv-
alent to Theorem 1 for the case when the equilibrium concept is noncooperative and
mechanisms have to be closed. The proofs for the other cases are analogous to Green-
berg’s.
Independently of our paper, Ju (2001) proposes an analogous notion of implemen-
tation. He obtains a result similar to the noncooperative part of Theorem 1, but his
result requires a certain restriction on the domain of preferences. There are at least
two diﬀerences between his notion of implementation and ours. First, Ju requires all
feasible outcomes to be admissible, i.e., HN,ω(z) = X(N,ω). Actually, this condition
is considered in the next section, but we do not impose it at this point. Second, Ju
also requires that each agent’s consumption should be in his budget set while we do
not as mentioned previously. All we require is that no one has a preferred consumption
bundle in his budget set (see Footnote 8).
Remark 3. Theorem 1 does not mention anything about the cardinality of agents.
This means, in particular, that the result holds even when two-agent economies are
10See also Suh (1996).
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admissible. This is not the case for Nash implementation (Moore and Repullo, 1990;
Dutta and Sen, 1991b).
It may not be very surprising that our concept of implementation permits a simpler
characterization.11 Complexity in the characterizations of standard implementation
concepts is mostly due to the need to resolve disagreements in announcements. Typical
characterization theorems use mechanisms where each agent is asked to report a proﬁle
of preferences. This raises diﬃculties since agents may announce diﬀerent preference
proﬁles. This diﬃculty does not arise in our case because agents are assumed to take
the state as given and we can let the state include information about preferences.
The following is an immediate but interesting implication of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. A social choice correspondence is implementable in noncooperative
equilibrium if and only if it is implementable in cooperative equilibrium.
5 The Axioms
Theorem 1 is a complete characterization of social choice correspondences that can be
implemented by some mechanisms. A drawback of the result (and many of the general
“existence theorems” in the implementation literature) is that it relies on the assump-
tion that any mechanism can be used. In practice, not all mechanisms can be used;
some mechanisms are practical and others are not. Thus, it would be more interesting
to characterize social choice correspondences that can be implemented by “practical”
or “reasonable” mechanisms. This section introduces a few axioms of practical mech-
anisms and characterizes what can be implemented by eﬀectivity forms that satisfy
those axioms.12
The ﬁrst axiom is anonymity, which says that the eﬀectivity set does not depend
on the names of the agents.
Deﬁnition. We say that an eﬀectivity form (ZN,ω, EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN satisﬁes
anonymity if for all N ∈ N , all ω ∈ ΩN , and all S, T ⊆ N ,
ωS ∼ ωT =⇒ EN,ω(S, z) = EN,ω(T, z)
11Nash implementation does permit a simple characterization in economic environments where no
veto power is vacuous, but does not in general environments.
12For this point, see Jackson (1992). Dutta et al. (1995), Sjo¨stro¨m (1996), and Saijo et al. (1996),
among others, also propose deﬁnitions of reasonable mechanisms (game forms).
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where ωS ∼ ωT means that there exists a bijection β : T → S such that for all i ∈ T ,
ωi = ωβ(i).
Anonymity says that two coalitions with the same proﬁle of characteristics (thus
the same cardinality) have the same eﬀectivity set in each state. This is satisﬁed by
the Walrasian mechanism because two consumers with the same endowments have the
same budget set. Majority rule also satisﬁes anonymity.13
Deﬁnition. An eﬀectivity form (ZN,ω, EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN satisﬁes common
state space if for all N,N ′ ∈ N , all ω ∈ ΩN , and all ω′ ∈ ΩN ′ ,
ZN,ω = ZN
′,ω′ .
That is, the state space is deﬁned independently of the set of agents (N) and
the proﬁle of characteristics (ω). This condition would be desirable when the set of
agents and the proﬁle of characteristics change frequently and it is costly to change
the “framework” or “language” of the institution. The market mechanism satisﬁes the
axiom since the state space is the set of price vectors.
Remark 4. The requirement of common state space alone is not restrictive in the
sense that any implementable social choice correspondence can be implemented by an
eﬀectivity form with common state space. Indeed, if a social choice correspondence ϕ
is implemented by an eﬀectivity form (ZN,ω, EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN , then ϕ is imple-
mented by an eﬀectivity form (Z, EˆN,ω, HˆN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN where Z is the set of mappings
f such that f(N,ω) ∈ ZN,ω for all N ∈ N and all ω ∈ ΩN , and
EˆN,ω(S, f) = EN,ω(S, f(N,ω));
HˆN,ω(f) = HN,ω(f(N,ω)).
It is easy to see that the set of equilibrium allocations is identical for the two eﬀectivity
forms.
Deﬁnition. Let Γ = (Z,EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN be an eﬀectivity form with com-
mon state space. Then Γ is called local if for all N,N ′ ∈ N , all ω ∈ ΩN , all ω′ ∈ ΩN ′ ,
and all S ⊆ N ∩N ′, if ω′S = ωS , then
EN,ω(S, z) = EN
′,ω′(S, z) for all z ∈ Z.
13Anonymity is by no means innocuous. For example, an eﬀectivity form associated with a perfectly
“anonymous” game form may violate our anonymity axiom at non-diagonal strategy proﬁles.
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That is, an eﬀectivity form is local if the eﬀectivity set of a coalition in a given
state is independent of the characteristics of the agents outside of the coalition. The
market mechanism is local since a consumer at a grocery does not need to know other
consumers’ endowments.
Localness is also satisﬁed by income taxation in practice in the sense that the
amount of income tax that a taxpayer has to pay for a given year is independent of the
other taxpayers’ income level. A violation of localness means that taxpayers have to
report their income level before receiving a tax schedule from the government.
Localness is a strong condition, but it is meaningful for real-life institutions. The
condition would be desirable when the number of agents is large and it is costly or
time-consuming for the planner to collect information about all agents’ characteristics
before announcing eﬀectivity sets.
Note that in the deﬁnition of localness, |N ′| = |N | is allowed. This means that
the eﬀectivity set in a given state does not depend on the number of agents in the
economy. This is often the case in real life; indeed, one rarely pays careful attention to
the number of people involved in an institution.14
Localness is satisﬁed whenever the set of agents is ﬁxed (i.e., N is a singleton) and
agents are identical except for their preferences (i.e., |Ω| = 1).
When common state space and localness are satisﬁed, we can write the eﬀectivity set
as E(S, ωS , z), which denotes the set of proﬁles of consumption bundles that coalition
S with characteristic proﬁle ωS can induce in state z regardless of the identities and
characteristics of the other agents in the economy. If anonymity is also satisﬁed, then
we can write E(ωS , z), which denotes the set of proﬁles of consumption bundles that
any coalition T with characteristics ω′T ∼ ωS can induce in state z. Thus, in what
follows, we sometimes write E instead of EN,ω.
Our ﬁnal axiom pertains to the correspondence HN,ω.
Deﬁnition. An eﬀectivity form (ZN,ω, EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN is non-exclusive if
for all N ∈ N and all ω ∈ ΩN ,
HN,ω(z) = X(N,ω) for all z ∈ ZN,ω.
That is, an eﬀectivity form is non-exclusive if no feasible allocation is prohibited in
any state. This means that a feasible allocation is an equilibrium as long as it cannot
be blocked by agents. This axiom is satisﬁed by the Walrasian mechanism since it only
14Note, however, that localness is not satisﬁed by majority rule (Example 7) when the number of
agents is variable. This is why we do count the number of people in a faculty meeting before we vote.
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requires individual optimality and feasibility. On the other hand, the axiom is violated
by game forms; game forms are “exclusive” in the sense that the planner blocks all
allocations but one.
6 Exchange Economies
This section considers exchange economies deﬁned in Example 1. We start with a few
standard deﬁnitions.
Given an economy e, we denote by P (e) and I(e) the set of Pareto eﬃcient and
individually rational feasible allocations, respectively. We also denote IP(e) = I(e) ∩
P (e).
We denote by W (e) the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations for economy
e = (N,R, ω), i.e., the set of allocations x in X(N,ω) for which there exists p ∈ R+\{0}
such that for all i ∈ N and all yi ∈ R+, p · yi ≤ p · ωi implies xi Ri yi.
We denote by C(e) the core of e, which is the set of cooperative equilibrium allo-
cations of the eﬀectivity form in Example 6.
We deﬁne the quasi-core as the set of feasible allocations that no coalition with
two or more members can block by redistributing endowments within the coalition. Let
QC (e) denote the quasi-core of economy e. Evidently, QC (e) ⊇ C(e).
A sub-correspondence of a social choice correspondence ϕ is a social choice cor-
respondence ϕ′ such that ∅ = ϕ′(e) ⊆ ϕ(e) for all e. This is denoted as ϕ′ ⊆ ϕ.
The ﬁrst main result in this section is a characterization of the quasi-core.
Theorem 2. Consider an environment of exchange economies deﬁned in Example 1
where N ∈ N implies S ∈ N for all non-empty subsets S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2. Suppose
that a social choice correspondence ϕ ⊆ P is implemented in either noncooperative or
cooperative equilibrium by a local and non-exclusive eﬀectivity form with common state
space. Then ϕ ⊆ QC.
Proof. Let Γ = (Z,E,HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN be a local and non-exclusive eﬀectivity form
with common state space and suppose that it implements a sub-correspondence ϕ ⊆ P
in cooperative (resp. noncooperative) equilibrium. Given an economy e = (N,R, ω),
suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists an allocation x ∈ ϕ(e) \ QC (e).
Then x is blocked by some coalition S ⊆ N with at least two members and thus there
exists an allocation y ∈ X(S, ωS) such that yi Pi xi for all i ∈ S. Since Ω = R++ and
preferences are continuous and strongly monotonic, we can assume yi  0 for all i ∈ S.
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Now, let R′S ∈ RS be a preference proﬁle for S such that
L(x,R′i) = L(x,Ri) for all i ∈ S. (2)
That is, R′i and Ri have the same indiﬀerence curve at xi. Let z ∈ Z be a state such
that (x, z) is a cooperative (resp. noncooperative) equilibrium of the eﬀectivity form Γ
for e. Then for all T ⊆ S (resp. for all singletons T ⊆ S),
E(T, ωT , z) ⊆ L(x,RT ) ⊆ L(y,R′T ).
It then follows from non-exclusivity that (y, z) is a cooperative (resp. noncooperative)
equilibrium of Γ for (S,R′S , ωS). But there exists R
′
S ∈ RS such that (2) holds and y
is not Pareto eﬃcient for (S,R′S , ωS); it suﬃces to perturb agent i’s MRS at yi.
15 This
is in contradiction with ϕ ⊆ P .
Given this result, we can easily obtain a characterization of the core by adding
individual rationality.
Corollary 2. Consider an environment of exchange economies deﬁned in Exam-
ple 1 where N ∈ N implies S ∈ N for all non-empty subsets S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2.
Suppose that a social choice correspondence ϕ ⊆ IP is implemented in either nonco-
operative or cooperative equilibrium by a local and non-exclusive eﬀectivity form with
common state space. Then ϕ ⊆ C.
In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, anonymity is not used. It turns out that adding
anonymity gives us a characterization of Walrasian equilibrium, provided that the equi-
librium concept is noncooperative.
Theorem 3. Consider the environment of exchange economies deﬁned in Exam-
ple 1 where N is the set of all non-empty ﬁnite subsets N ⊆ N with |N | ≥ 2. Suppose
that a social choice correspondence ϕ ⊆ P can be implemented in noncooperative equi-
librium by an anonymous, local, and non-exclusive eﬀectivity form with common state
space. Then ϕ ⊆W .
Proof. Suppose that a sub-correspondence ϕ ⊆ P is implemented in noncooper-
ative equilibrium by an anonymous, local, and non-exclusive eﬀectivity form Γ =
(Z,E,HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN with common state space. Given an economy e = (N,R, ω) ∈ E ,
15This step requires that S contain at least two agents. If S = {i}, then yi = ωi and y is trivially
eﬃcient for ({i}, R′i, ωi) since preferences are monotonic.
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suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists an allocation x ∈ ϕ(e)\W (e). For a
positive integer r, let r ∗x and r ∗ e denote the r-fold replica of x and e, respectively, in
the sense of Debreu and Scarf (1963). Debreu and Scarf have proved that there exists
a positive integer r such that r ∗ x is not in the core of r ∗ e. Then for a suﬃciently
large r, r ∗ x is not in the quasi-core of r ∗ e. Now, let z ∈ Z be a state such that (x, z)
is a noncooperative equilibrium of Γ for e. Then for all i ∈ N ,
E(ωi, z) ⊆ L(x,Ri) = L(r ∗ x,Ri).
This means that (r ∗ x, z) is a noncooperative equilibrium of Γ for r ∗ e.16 Thus
r ∗ x ∈ ϕ(r ∗ e). This is in contradiction with Theorem 2 since r ∗ x /∈ QC(r ∗ e).
We note that this theorem does not hold for cooperative equilibrium. A counter-
example is the core mechanism (Example 6), which is anonymous, local, and non-
exclusive. What it implements in cooperative equilibrium is the core correspondence.
7 Public Good Economies
Theorem 3 shows that Walrasian equilibrium is characterized by anonymity, localness,
non-exclusivity, and Pareto eﬃciency. This section explores the implications of the
same axioms in the context of economies with a public good. A particularly inter-
esting question to ask is whether we obtain an analogous characterization of Lindahl
equilibrium.
We ﬁrst show that anonymity is not compatible with Pareto eﬃciency in public
good economies.
Theorem 4. In an environment of public good economies deﬁned in Example 2,
there exists no anonymous eﬀectivity form that implements a social choice correspon-
dence ϕ ⊆ P in noncooperative equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that a correspondence ϕ ⊆ P is implemented in noncooperative
equilibrium by an anonymous eﬀectivity form Γ = (ZN,ω, EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN . Con-
sider a two-person economy (N,R, ω) ∈ E where N = {1, 2}, (ω1, ω2) = (10, 10), and
the utility functions are given by
ui(y, xi) = αi
√
y + xi for all i ∈ {1, 2}
16This step requires the equilibrium concept to be noncooperative.
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where (α1, α2) = (1, 3).17 Let (y, x) ∈ ϕ(N,R, ω). By Pareto eﬃciency, the public-good
level is y = 4. Feasibility then implies x1 + x2 = 16, and so there exists k ∈ {1, 2} such
that xk ≤ 8. Let z ∈ ZN,ω be a state such that ((y, x), z) is a noncooperative equilib-
rium of Γ for (N,R, ω). Then ((y, x), z) is also a noncooperative equilibrium of Γ for
(N,R′, ω) where R′1 = R′2 = Rk. Agent k cannot block (y, x) since his preferences have
not changed. Neither can agent j = k since his eﬀectivity set is the same as agent k’s
and xj ≥ xk. However, (y, x) is not Pareto eﬃcient for (N,R′, ω), a contradiction.
The result is intuitive given that agents should have diﬀerent MRS at Pareto eﬃcient
allocations in public good economies. The Lindahl mechanism uses personalized prices
and it is intuitively clear that a personalized system is necessary to attain Pareto
eﬃciency in public good economies. Theorem 4 conﬁrms the intuition.
We now formulate the Lindahl mechanism as an eﬀectivity form.
Example 8 (Lindahl Mechanism).




EN,ω(i, p) = {(y, xi) ∈ R2+ : piy + xi ≤ ωi};
HN,ω(p) = X(N,ω).
That is, the state speciﬁes the personalized price of the public good for each potential
agent, with the condition that the sum of the all prices is one. The eﬀectivity set
is given by the usual budget set. The noncooperative equilibrium of this mechanism
coincides with the Lindahl equilibrium.
Although the Lindahl mechanism violates anonymity, it satisﬁes localness and non-
exclusivity. Thus, in light of Theorem 3 and similarity between Walrasian and Lindahl
equilibria, it makes sense to ask whether Lindahl equilibrium is characterized by local-
ness, non-exclusivity, and Pareto eﬃciency. The answer turns out to be negative. As
the following example shows, there exists a local and non-exclusive mechanism that im-
plements a correspondence ϕ ⊆ P but whose equilibrium outcomes are not necessarily
Lindahl allocations.
Example 9 (Nonlinear Lindahl Mechanism). The example is a variant of the
Lindahl mechanism where the frontier of a budget set is not necessarily straight. Let
F be the set of all functions fi : R+ → R+ such that fi(0) = 0. Then we deﬁne an
17The case when two-person economies are not admissible can be proved analogously.
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eﬀectivity form by
Z = {f = (f1, f2, . . . ) ∈ FN :
∑
i∈N
fi(y) = y for all y ∈ R+};
EN,ω(i, f) = {(y, xi) ∈ R2+ : fi(y) + xi ≤ ωi};
HN,ω(f) = X(N,ω).
Here, fi(y) is the amount that agent i is asked to pay when the public-good level is
y. The condition
∑
i∈N fi(y) = y ensures that the total payments do not exceed the
cost of the public good. This eﬀectivity form is local, non-exclusive, and individually
rational (i.e., (0, ωi) ∈ EN,ω(i, f) since fi(0) = 0).
This mechanism has a noncooperative equilibrium in any economy. This is simply
because if ((y, x), p) is a Lindahl equilibrium, then ((y, x), f) is a noncooperative equi-
librium where fi(y) = piy for all agents present in the economy. It is easy to see that
not all noncooperative equilibrium outcomes are Lindahl allocations.
The “nonlinear” Lindahl mechanism implements a correspondence ϕ ⊆ P in non-
cooperative equilibrium. To conﬁrm this, let ((y, x), f) be a noncooperative equilib-
rium for economy e = (N,R, ω). Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a fea-
sible allocation (y′, x′) such that (y′, x′i) Pi (y, xi) for all i ∈ N . This means that
(y′, x′i) is not in i’s budget set, i.e., fi(y












On the other hand, the characterization of the core in exchange economies can be
easily extended to public good economies. We omit the proof since it is analogous to
the one for exchange economies.
Theorem 5. Consider an environment of public good economies deﬁned in Exam-
ple 2 where N ∈ N implies S ∈ N for all non-empty subsets S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2.
Suppose that a social choice correspondence ϕ ⊆ IP is implemented in either nonco-
operative or cooperative equilibrium by a local and non-exclusive eﬀectivity form with
common state space. Then ϕ ⊆ C.
8 General Environments
This section considers the same list of axioms in general environments. The following
condition is a necessary and suﬃcient condition.
Deﬁnition. A social choice correspondence ϕ satisﬁes intersection monotonic-
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ity if for all (N,R, ω) ∈ E , all x ∈ ϕ(N,R, ω), all (N ′, R′, ω′) ∈ E , and all x′ ∈ X(N ′, ω′),
if for all i ∈ N ′,
L(x′, R′i) = C if ω
′










then x′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′, w′).
Condition (3) says that if ω′i = ωj for all j ∈ N , then x′ gives agent i a most
preferred consumption bundle for R′i. Such a consumption bundle does not exist in
typical economic environments with monotonic preferences, in which case (3) does not
hold. Condition (4) says that if ω′i = ωj for some j ∈ N , then x′ and R′i are such that
any allocation y that is preferred to x′ for R′i is also preferred to x for Rj for some
j ∈ N with ωj = ω′i.
Theorem 6. A social choice correspondence ϕ is implemented by an anonymous,
local, and non-exclusive eﬀectivity form with common state space in noncooperative
equilibrium if and only if ϕ satisﬁes intersection monotonicity.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 6 pertains to noncooperative equilibrium. For cooperative equilibrium,
the following slightly weaker condition is a necessary and suﬃcient condition.
Deﬁnition. A social choice correspondence ϕ satisﬁes coalitional intersection
monotonicity if for all (N,R, ω) ∈ E , all x ∈ ϕ(N,R, ω), all (N ′, R′, ω′) ∈ E , and all
x′ ∈ X(N ′, ω′), if for all S ⊆ N ′,
L(x′, R′S) = C








then x′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′, w′).18
Condition (6) says that if ω′S ∼ ωT for some T ⊆ N , then x′ and R′S are such that
18For the deﬁnition of ωT ∼ ω′S , see the deﬁnition of anonymity. By ω′S  ωT , we mean that it is
not the case that ω′S ∼ ωT .
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any allocation y that dominates x′ for coalition S with R′S also dominates x for RT for
some coalition T ⊆ N such that ωT ∼ ω′S .
Theorem 7. A social choice correspondence ϕ is implemented by an anonymous,
local, and non-exclusive eﬀectivity form with common state space in cooperative equi-
librium if and only if ϕ satisﬁes coalitional intersection monotonicity.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is easy to see that intersection monotonicity implies coalitional intersection mono-
tonicity. The converse is false as the following example shows.
Example 10 (Coalitional Intersection Monotonicity Does not Imply Inter-
section Monotonicity). Consider a voting environment where there are two agents
(1 and 2) and two alternatives (a and b), i.e., N = {{1, 2}} and X(N,ω) = {a, b}.
Each agent has a strict ranking over {a, b}, and so the set of admissible preferences
is R = {Ra, Rb} where a P a b and b P b a. There are two types of agents and we let
Ω = {a, b}. Now, consider an anonymous, local, and non-exclusive eﬀectivity form Γ
where the common state space is arbitrary and
E(ωi, z) = ∅;
E((ω1, ω2), z) =


{ω1} if ω1 = ω2;
∅ if ω1 = ω2.
That is, a coalition is eﬀective for some alternative if and only if the coalition consists
of two agents of the same type. A coalition consisting of two agents of type a (resp. b)
is eﬀective for alternative a (resp. b). The cooperative equilibrium outcomes of the
eﬀectivity form are
C(Γ, (N,R, ω)) =


{a} if R = (Ra, Ra) and ω = (a, a);
{b} if R = (Rb, Rb) and ω = (b, b);
{a, b} otherwise.
(7)
That is, when both agents in the economy are of type a and prefer a to b, then the
grand coalition blocks b and so the unique cooperative equilibrium outcome is a. When
agents diﬀer in their types or preferences, no alternative is blocked by any coalitions.
This implies that the correspondence deﬁned by ϕ(·) ≡ C(Γ, ·) satisﬁes coalitional
intersection monotonicity (Theorem 7). But ϕ does not satisfy intersection monotonic-
24
ity. To see this, note that
b ∈ ϕ({1, 2}, (Ra, Ra), (a, b)). (8)
This and intersection monotonicity imply b ∈ ϕ({1, 2}, (Ra, Ra), (a, a)), which is in
contradiction with (7).
The underlying logic is simple. If ϕ can be implemented in noncooperative equilib-
rium by an anonymous, local, and non-exclusive eﬀectivity form, then (8) implies that
no agent of type a can block b in the underlying equilibrium state. It then follows that,
when both agents are of type a, alternative b is a noncooperative equilibrium outcome
although b is not ϕ-optimal.
9 Concluding Remark
The basic idea behind our reduced-form approach to implementation is to use the no-
tions and ideas of price theory. Given that the price theory oﬀers the best formulation
of one of the most important resource-allocation mechanisms, we ﬁnd it reasonable to
use some of the ideas of the theory for a more general study of mechanism design.
The notion of mechanism proposed in this paper is a straightforward generalization
of the Walrasian mechanism, and the ideas behind anonymity and localness are not
new in price theory. We depart from price theory by treating mechanisms as variable
and asking whether there exists a mechanism that achieves a given social choice cor-
respondence in equilibrium. Our axiomatic characterizations are rather simple, but
they demonstrate that our approach can generate interesting implementation-theoretic
results and useful insights into resource-allocation mechanisms.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We give a proof only for the case when the equilibrium concept is cooperative and the
mechanism is not required to be closed. The proofs for the other cases are essentially
identical to the one given below.
To prove the “only if” part, let ϕ be a correspondence implementable in cooperative
equilibrium by a mechanism Γ = (ZN,ω, EN,ω, HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN . To show that ϕ is
Gevers monotonic, let e = (N,R, ω) ∈ E , x ∈ ϕ(e), and R′ ∈ RN be such that
L(x,Ri) ⊆ L(x,R′i) for all i ∈ N. (9)
Since Γ implements ϕ in cooperative equilibrium, there exists a state z ∈ ZN,ω such
that (x, z) is a cooperative equilibrium of Γ for e. Thus,
x ∈ HN,ω(z);
EN,ω(S, z) ⊆ L(x,RS) for all S ⊆ N.
It is easy to verify that (9) implies L(x,RS) ⊆ L(x,R′S). Thus (x, z) is also a cooperative
equilibrium of Γ for (N,R′, ω). This establishes x ∈ ϕ(N,R′, ω).
To prove the “if” part, let ϕ be a correspondence that is Gevers monotonic. We
show that ϕ is implemented in cooperative equilibrium by the mechanism Γ deﬁned by
ZN,ω = {(x,R) ∈ X(N,ω)×RN : x ∈ ϕ(N,R, ω)};
EN,ω(S, (x,R)) = L(x,RS);
HN,ω(x,R) = {x}.
That is, a state for (N,ω) is a pair (x,R) such that x ∈ ϕ(N,R, ω). In state (x,R),
each coalition is eﬀective for any proﬁle of consumption bundles that does not dominate
x for RS . To see that this mechanism implements ϕ in cooperative equilibrium, take
any economy e = (N,R, ω) ∈ E .
(i) To prove ϕ(e) ⊆ C (Γ, e), let x ∈ ϕ(e). Then it is evident that (x, (x,R)) is a
cooperative equilibrium of Γ for e. Thus x ∈ C (Γ, e).
(ii) To prove C (Γ, e) ⊆ ϕ(e), let x ∈ C (Γ, e). Then there exists a state (x′, R′) ∈
ZN,ω such that (x, (x′, R′)) is a cooperative equilibrium of Γ for e. Since x has to be
admissible in the equilibrium state, x′ = x. Since (x, (x,R′)) is also a noncooperative
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equilibrium, we have
L(x,Ri) ⊇ EN,ω(i, (x,R′)) ≡ L(x,R′i).
Thus, by Gevers monotonicity, x ∈ ϕ(N,R, ω).
Remark 5. Obviously, the eﬀectivity form used in the “if” part of the above proof
implements ϕ in noncooperative as well as cooperative equilibrium.
Remark 6. The eﬀectivity form used in the “if” part of the above proof satisﬁes
superadditivity, namely, for any pair of disjoint coalitions S, T ⊆ N , if yS ∈ EN,ω(S, z)
and yT ∈ EN,ω(T, z), then yS∪T ∈ EN,ω(S ∪ T, z). Superadditivity is reasonable al-
though we do not require it. If superadditivity is not required, then implementability
in noncooperative equilibrium trivially implies implementability in cooperative equi-
librium. The above proof establishes that even if eﬀectivity forms are required to be
superadditive, implementability in noncooperative equilibrium is equivalent to imple-
mentability in cooperative equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 6
(“only if” part) Suppose that a correspondence ϕ is implemented in noncooperative
equilibrium by an eﬀectivity form Γ = (Z,E,HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN that is anonymous, local,
non-exclusive, and satisﬁes common state space. To show that ϕ is intersection mono-
tonic, take any e = (N,R, ω) ∈ E , e′ = (N ′, R′, ω′) ∈ E , x ∈ ϕ(e), and x′ ∈ X(N ′, ω′)
such that for all i ∈ N ′, (3) and (4) holds. Since x ∈ ϕ(e) = N(Γ, e), there exists a
state z ∈ Z such that
E(ωi, z) ⊆ L(x,Ri) for all i ∈ N. (10)
We would like to prove that for all i ∈ N ′,
E(ω′i, z) ⊆ L(x′, R′i). (11)
This holds trivially for i such that ω′i /∈ {ωj}j∈N by (3). Thus consider i ∈ N ′ for whom
there exists j ∈ N such that ωj = ω′i. Then E(ω′i, z) = E(ωj , z) ⊆ L(x,Rj) by (10).
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L(x,Rj) ⊆ L(x′, R′i),
where the second inclusion follows from (4). Thus we conclude that (11) holds for all
i ∈ N ′. Since Γ is non-exclusive, this implies x′ ∈ N(Γ, (N ′, R′, ω′)) = ϕ(N ′, R′, ω′).
(“if” part) Let ϕ be a correspondence satisfying intersection monotonicity. We now
deﬁne an eﬀectivity form that satisﬁes all of our axioms:
Z = {(e, x) : e ∈ E and x ∈ ϕ(e)};
E(ωi, (N ′, R′, ω′, x′)) =


C if ωi /∈ {ω′j}j∈N ′ ;⋂
j∈N ′ s.t.
ω′j=ωi
L(x′, R′j) otherwise; (12)
HN,ω(z) = X(N,ω).
We show that this mechanism implements ϕ in noncooperative equilibrium.
Take any economy e = (N,R, ω) ∈ E . We ﬁrst show that ϕ(e) ⊆ N(Γ, e). So, let






Thus (x, (e, x)) is a noncooperative equilibrium of Γ for e. Thus x ∈ N(Γ, e).
To show that N(Γ, e) ⊆ ϕ(e), let x ∈ N(Γ, e). This means that there exists z′ ≡
(N ′, R′, ω′, x′) in Z such that for all i ∈ N ,
E(ωi, z′) ⊆ L(x,Ri).
This and (12) mean that for all i ∈ N ,






Hence, by intersection monotonicity, x ∈ ϕ(N,R, ω).
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 7
(“only if” part) Suppose that a correspondence ϕ is implemented in cooperative equilib-
rium by an eﬀectivity form Γ = (Z,E,HN,ω)N∈N ,ω∈ΩN that satisﬁes all of our axioms.
To show that ϕ satisﬁes coalitional intersection monotonicity, take any e = (N,R, ω) ∈
E , x ∈ ϕ(e), e′ = (N ′, R′, ω′) ∈ E , and x′ ∈ X(N ′, ω′) such that for all S ⊆ N ′, (5) and
(6) hold. Since x ∈ ϕ(e) = C(Γ, e), there exists a state z ∈ Z such that
E(ωS , z) ⊆ L(x,RS) for all S ⊆ N.
We would like to prove that for all S ⊆ N ′,
E(ω′S , z) ⊆ L(x′, R′S). (13)
This holds trivially if there exists no T ⊆ N such that ω′S ∼ ωT , by (5). Thus consider
S ⊆ N ′ such that ω′S ∼ ωT for some T ⊆ N . Then E(ω′S , z) = E(ωT , z) ⊆ L(x,RT ) by
(6). Since this holds for all T ⊆ N such that ωT ∼ ω′S , we have




L(x,RT ) ⊆ L(x′, R′S),
where the second inclusion follows from (6). Thus we conclude that (13) holds for all
S ⊆ N ′. Since Γ is non-exclusive, this implies x′ ∈ C(Γ, (N ′, R′, ω′)) = ϕ(N ′, R′, ω′).
(“if” part) Let ϕ be a correspondence that satisﬁes coalitional intersection mono-
tonicity. We deﬁne an eﬀectivity form that satisﬁes all of our axioms:
Z = {(e, x) : e ∈ E and x ∈ ϕ(e)};
E(ωS , (N ′, R′, ω′, x′)) =


CS if ωS  ω′T for all T ⊆ N ′;⋂
T⊆N ′ s.t.
ω′T∼ωS
L(x′, R′T ) otherwise; (14)
HN,ω(z) = X(N,ω).
We show that this mechanism implements ϕ in cooperative equilibrium.
Take any economy e = (N,R, ω) ∈ E . We ﬁrst show that ϕ(e) ⊆ C(Γ, e). So, let
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x ∈ ϕ(e). Then z ≡ (e, x) is an element of Z. It is evident that for all S ⊆ N ,




L(x,RT ) ⊆ L(x,RS)
simply because ωS ∼ ωS . Thus (x, (e, x)) is a cooperative equilibrium of Γ for e. Thus
x ∈ C(Γ, e).
To show that C(Γ, e) ⊆ ϕ(e), let x ∈ C(Γ, e). This means that there exists a state
z′ ≡ (N ′, R′, ω′, x′) in Z such that for all S ⊆ N ,
E(ωS , z′) ⊆ L(x,RS).
This and (14) mean that for all S ⊆ N ,






Hence, by coalitional intersection monotonicity, x ∈ ϕ(N,R, ω).
B Appendix: Independence of the Axioms
This section examines the independence of the axioms in Theorem 3. We exhibit
eﬀectivity forms that satisfy all of the axioms in the theorem except for one. To make
this exercise more interesting, we have chosen mechanisms that satisfy the individual
rationality condition, i.e., ωi ∈ EN,ω(i, z).
Example 11 (Not Anonymous). We exhibit an eﬀectivity form that satisﬁes all
axioms in Theorem 3 except for anonymity. We deﬁne a state as a list z = (k, p, δ, Rk) ∈
N × R++ × R+ × R. To describe the eﬀectivity set, ﬁx a state z = (k, p, δ, Rk) and
ωk ∈ Ω. Let x∗k ∈ R+ be the most preferred bundle in
{yk ∈ R+ : p · yk ≤ max{0, p · ωk − δ}}
30
for Rk. Then the eﬀectivity set of agent k with ωk in state (k, p, δ, Rk) is deﬁned by
E(k, ωk, (k, p, δ, Rk)) =


{yk ∈ R+ : x∗k Rk yk} if x∗k Rk ωk and δ > 0;
{yk ∈ R+ : p · yk ≤ p · ωk} otherwise.
The eﬀectivity set of agents i = k is deﬁned by
E(i, ωi, (k, p, δ, Rk)) = {yk ∈ R+ : p · yi ≤ p · ωi + δ}. (15)
Finally, we let HN,ω(z) = X(N,ω) for all states z.
This mechanism has a noncooperative equilibrium in any economy. To see this, let
(x, p) be a Walrasian equilibrium of e = (N,R, ω). Then trivially, (x, (i, p, 0, Ri)) is a
noncooperative equilibrium regardless of i ∈ N.
The noncooperative equilibria of the mechanism are all Pareto eﬃcient. To see this,
let (x, z) with z = (k, p, δ, R′k) be a noncooperative equilibrium for e = (N,R, ω). If
δ = 0, then x is trivially Pareto eﬃcient for e. So consider the case when δ > 0. Then
(15) implies that, for all i ∈ N \ {k}, we have p · xi ≥ p · ωi + δ > p · ωi. Feasibility of
x then implies that k is in N and
p · xk < p · ωk. (16)
Let x∗k ∈ R+ be the most preferred bundle in {yk ∈ R+ : p · yk ≤ max{0, p · ωk − δ}}
for R′k. Then (16) implies that E(k, ωk, z) = {yk ∈ R+ : x∗k R′k yk}. Suppose, by
contradiction, that x is not Pareto eﬃcient for e. Then there exists an allocation
y ∈ X(N,ω) such that yi Pi xi for all i ∈ N . This implies that p · yk > p · ωk − δ and,




yi > p ·
∑
i∈N
ωi + δ(|N | − 2),
which is a contradiction since |N | ≥ 2.
An analogous argument shows that the eﬀectivity form has a noncooperative equi-
librium with δ > 0 only in the case of two agents. It is easy to see that, for some
economy with two agents, there exists a noncooperative equilibrium that yields a non-
Walrasian allocation.
Example 12 (Not Local). We exhibit an eﬀectivity form that satisﬁes all the
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axioms in Theorem 3 except for localness.19 Deﬁne a state as a pair (p, f) where p
belongs to R++ and f is a function that associates with each N ∈ N and each ω ∈ ΩN
an element f(N,ω) = (x,R) ∈ X(N,ω)×RN such that x is Pareto eﬃcient for (N,R, ω)
and xiRiωi for all i ∈ N . Let Z be the set of all pairs (p, f) of this form. The eﬀectivity
set is deﬁned by
EN,ω(i, (p, f)) =


{yi ∈ R+ : p · yi ≤ p · ωi} if ωj = ωk for some distinct j, k ∈ N ;
L(x,Ri) otherwise
where (x,R) = f(N,ω). That is, when there are agents with identical endowments,
f is ignored and the market mechanism is used. On the other hand, when no two
agents have identical endowments, p is ignored and agent i’s eﬀectivity set is set to
the lower contour set L(x,Ri) where (x,R) is the one assigned by f . Finally, we set
HN,ω(p, f) = X(N,ω).
This mechanism has a noncooperative equilibrium. To see this, let (x, p) be a
Walrasian equilibrium of e = (N,R, ω). Then, for f such that f(N,ω) = (x,R),
(x, (p, f)) is a noncooperative equilibrium of the mechanism for e.
The noncooperative equilibria of the mechanism are all Pareto eﬃcient. To see
this, let (x, (p, f)) be a noncooperative equilibrium of the mechanism for e = (N,R, ω).
If ωi = ωj for some i = j, then (x, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium and so x is Pareto
eﬃcient. Thus, suppose that ωi = ωj for all i = j. Let f(N,ω) = (x′, R′), where x′ is
Pareto eﬃcient for (N,R′, ω). Let p′ ∈ R++ be a supporting price vector for x′, i.e.,
for all y′i ∈ R+, if yi P ′i x′i, then p′ · yi > p′ · x′i. Suppose, by contradiction, that x is not
Pareto eﬃcient for (N,R, ω). Then there exists an allocation y ∈ X(N,ω) such that
yi Pi xi for all i ∈ N . Since agent i cannot block xi and he prefers yi to xi, it follows
that yi /∈ EN,ω(i, (p, f)). This means yi /∈ L(x′, R′i), and thus p′ · yi > p′ · x′i. Since this





Example 13 (Exclusive). We ﬁrst introduce new deﬁnitions. Given a set B ⊆ R+
and a point xi ∈ B, we say that a vector p ∈ R++ is strongly normal to B at xi if
19A simpler but not individually rational example is the market mechanism operated from equal
division. Speciﬁcally, let Z = R+ \ {0}, HN,ω(p) = X(N,ω), and




That is, the planner divides the aggregate endowments equally among the agents before operating the
market mechanism.
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for all Ri ∈ R, if xi Ri yi for all yi ∈ B, then for all yi ∈ R+,
yi Pi xi =⇒ p · yi > p · xi.
For example, if xi  0 and the boundary of B has a kink at xi, then there exists no
strongly normal vector to B at xi.
We now deﬁne an eﬀectivity form as follows. Let a state be a correspondence B
that associates with each ωi ∈ Ω a set B(ωi) ⊆ R+ such that
1. ωi ∈ B(ωi) for all ωi ∈ Ω; and
2. there exists p ∈ R++ such that, for all ωi ∈ Ω, p is strongly normal to B(ωi) at
ωi.
Let Z be the set of all correspondences B of this form. For example, if we take a vector
p ∈ R++ and deﬁne B by B(ωi) = {yi ∈ R+ : p · yi ≤ p · ωi}, then B ∈ Z.
Let the eﬀectivity set be given by E(ωi, B) = B(ωi). Finally, we deﬁne HN,ω(B) to
be the set of all allocations x ∈ X(N,ω) such that
1. xi ∈ B(ωi) for all i ∈ N ; and
2. there exists p ∈ R++ such that, for all i ∈ N , p is strongly normal to B(ωi) at xi.
Note that HN,ω(B) is non-empty since it contains the initial allocation, ω. See Figure 1.
The mechanism has a noncooperative equilibrium in any economy. To see this, let
e = (N,R, ω) be an economy and let (x, p) be a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy.
Consider a state B ∈ Z deﬁned by B(ωi) = {yi ∈ R+ : p · yi ≤ p · ωi}. Then it is easy
to see that (x,B) is a noncooperative equilibrium of the mechanism for e.
Finally, the noncooperative equilibria of the mechanism are all Pareto eﬃcient. To
see this, let (x,B) be a noncooperative equilibrium of the mechanism for e = (N,R, ω).
Since x ∈ HN,ω(B), there exists p ∈ R++ such that, for all i ∈ N , p is strongly normal
to B(ωi) at xi. Since xi is a most preferred bundle in B(ωi) for Ri, the deﬁnition of
strong normality implies that for all yi ∈ R+,
yi Pi xi =⇒ p · yi > p · xi. (17)
Suppose, by contradiction, that x is not Pareto eﬃcient for e. Then there exists an
allocation y ∈ X(N,ω) such that yi Pi xi for all i ∈ N . Then, by (17), p · yi > p · xi for
all i ∈ N , and so p ·∑i yi > p ·
∑
i xi, a contradiction.
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Example 14 (Not Pareto Eﬃcient). Consider an eﬀectivity form in which
E(ωi, z) = {ωi} and HN,ω(z) = X(N,ω). This mechanism is anonymous, local, and
non-exclusive, but its noncooperative equilibrium allocations are not necessarily Wal-
rasian.
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Figure 1: This is drawn in an Edgeworth box. The set B(ω1) is the area below the
lower curve. For this example, HN,ω(B) = {x, ω}.
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